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This study seeks to explore policy framework on the impact of moral hazard problem in the 
JFMP in which government, the owner of forest resource, can not legally monitor actions of 
JFM households, the agent of the programme, who illegally extract timber forest products. 
Despite much decrease of illegal collection of  TFPs  after JFM by the JFM households, 
some poor JFM households have higher incidence in the illegal extraction of  TFPs to meet 
up their minimum subsistence in which law or force can not effectively control the same 
which  might create more adverse effect on the sustainability of forest resource. 
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I. Introduction 
As is well known, situations of asymmetric information are those in which one 
agent knows something that another does not. Without complete information, markets 
will be incomplete and can fail to allocate resources efficiently. One type of asymmetric 
information problem, referred to as moral hazard or incentive problem arises when 
actions of one person are unobservable to the other. This study seeks to explore policy 
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framework on the impact of moral hazard problem in the JFMP in which government, the 
owner of forest resource and regulator of JFM programme, can not legally monitor 
actions of JFM households, the agent of the programme, who illegally extract timber 
forest products which create more adverse effect on the sustainability of forest resource. 
Some researchers (e.g. Agarwal, 1986; Mukherjee, 1995; Naik, 1997; Saxena and Sarin 
1999) have questioned the belief that excessive foraging of forest products by the rural 
poor is primarily responsible for shortages of forest resources and thus threatening the 
sustainability of forest resources. But, the findings of these studies are largely ignored by 
many development practitioners (Shiva, 1999; Poffenberger, 1995; Poffenberger et al. 
1996; Correa, 1999). They are of the view that commercial demands have resulted in 
large-scale forest destruction. Earlier, despite government regulation, people would use 
the forests for firewood, manure and NTFPs. With the introduction of JFMP, people agree 
not to use the forest for these purposes, or to use only specified areas, thereby restricting 
their use of the forest (Correa, 1999). It has been proved that such community-based 
forest protection activities resulted in the rapid regeneration of degraded natural forests 
and offered the best prospects for sustainable forestry (Poffenberger, 1995: 350-60; Vira, 
1999: 259-60). This study seems to be important in that in a comparative study between 
some JFM and non-JFM households in West Bengal, this paper tries to find out whether 
JFM programme reduces the moral hazard problem of government securing the right of 
local need of poor forest communities on forest land with higher sustainability of forest 
resources and thereby suggest policy prescriptions for broader livelihood perspective.  
This paper proceeds as follows. Section II presents the importance of the study. 
The data set and methodology appear in section III. Section IV presents the key results of 
the study. Section V provides a simple theoretical model based on the empirical findings. 
Conclusions are contained in section IV. 
 
II. Importance of the Study 
In the context of Indian forestry, several strands have contributed to the present 
emphasis on community involvement in forest protection. JFM emerges as the latest in a 
long history of policy changes, attempting to create a new relationship between ‘state’ and 
‘community’. The old custodian forest management systems were rendered ineffective in 
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the 1950s and 1960s due to various reasons, mainly traditional emphasis on production of 
commercial wood and disregard for local needs (Sarmah and Rai, 2001:213; Poffenberger, 
1995:342-50). Against this old custodian forest management system, the local 
communities in different parts of India have mobilized repeatedly over a long time to 
protect their traditional rights of subsistence needs on forest resources. In keeping with 
this, the local forest fringe communities – Santal, Bhumij and Mahato tribal, and some low 
cast Hindus – in south West Bengal, the area of our study, mobilized repeatedly with 
various movement – like Chur Rebellion (1767-1805), Naik Revolt (1806-1816) and Hul 
Rebellion (1855)- against Mughal and British rulers to protect their traditional rights on 
forestland from long past. (Poffenberger, 1995:342-49; Duyker, 1987: 28-35; Dutta 1940: 
35; Sarker and Das, 2006a:271). The revision of India’s forest policy in 1988 marks a 
major departure from the earlier policies which emphasized on production of commercial 
wood and disregard for local need, because Government of India, then, could understand 
that until and unless the benefit of forest fringe communities is secured, neither forest 
resources nor forest management can be sustainable. However, to secure the right of local 
need of poor forest fringe communities from forest resources, the 1988 forest policy of the 
Government of India recognized the need to fulfill the requirements of fuel wood, fodder, 
minor forest produce and small timber of rural and tribal people, and emphasized the need 
to create a massive people’s movements for protection and development of forests. But the 
benefit-sharing arrangements between states and forest communities differ widely between 
states within the country. 
Hence the issue is: does these benefit-sharing arrangement between states and 
forest communities under community forest management programme meet up the survival 
need of poor forest communities from forest and thereby restricting the latter’s illegal 
collection of Timber Forest Products (TFPs)? Empirical evidence from across the world 
now confirms that community-based regimes are a viable option for the management of 
local common property resources (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Berkes, 1989; Bromley, 
1992; Correa, 1999; Lama and Buchy, 2002; Martin, 1992; Naik, 1995; Saxena and Sarin, 
1999; Singh, 1994 & 2001). But it is argued that the survival of community needs of poor 
communities should be recognized on a priority basis as pillars for strengthening 
community participation (Mukherjee, 1995). The most important factors motivating 
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massive local peoples’ participation for protection and development of forests is the 
expectations of immediate returns via wages and incomes from sale of old plantation and 
local consumption need to fill the requirements of fuel wood, fodder, minor forest produce 
and small timbers (Mukherjee, 1995; Naik, 1997; Saxena and Sarin 1999). The Arjuni (an 
area under JFM programme) experience in JFM of West Bengal shows that unless survival 
needs of food and livelihood are met, participation in natural resource management would 
always remain threatened (Mukherjee 1995: 3132). This experience goes a long way to 
show that survival needs are of prime importance and can easily destabilize community 
rights and benefits to resource management. The findings of Naik (1997), based on two 
case studies in Gujarat, help identify the critical factors in making JFM successful and 
controllable. Any JFM which does not recognize the significance of creating strategies for 
sustaining livelihood – basic food security – at the local level has a doubtful future (ibid). 
While successful examples of joint forest management in India were beginning to 
emerge in the Arabari Hill in Midnapore district of West Bengal  during the early 1970s 
(Sundar and Jeffery, 1999:28; Sivaramakrishnan, 1999:90), the JFM movement gathered 
momentum when in 1989 a programme of resuscitation and reestablishment of moribund 
sal and other hardwood forests in the districts of Midnapore, Bankura, Purulia, Burdwan 
and Birbhum in south West Bengal was initiated by the government with the active 
participation and involvement of the local people. In keeping with the JFM movement in 
India, West Bengal government’s resolution was also issued in 1989, declaring the 
principles of sharing of duties, responsibilities as well as the usufructs from the forests to 
the participant local people living in the fringe of the forests. The procedures for 
establishment of the institution called Forest Protection Committee (FPC), comprising of 
these participants as members, were also defined.  
The foundation of an innovative forest protection system and the participatory 
forest management was thus laid for the forests of south West Bengal which covers 
approximately 38 per cent of the total forest area of the State. While explaining the 
achievements of JFM programme in West Bengal, the State Forest Report (2000) clearly 
mentions: 
“As a result of participatory and joint forest management activities in south West 
Bengal the vast tract of scattered, over-exploited and degraded forests containing mainly 
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the sal were resuscitated and restored to productivity with great improvement in quality 
and density” (SFR, 2000:47). 
Government report (State Forest Report, 2000) reveals that the overexploitation of 
trees for timber was so severe that thousand and thousand hectares of forest lands in the 
south West Bengal except Sundarban were almost treated as bare plain land, when the 
JFM was established; but such lands are almost secured after JFM programme. Secondly, 
government revenue from the degraded forest was almost nil when the JFM was 
established, but it has significantly increased after JFM. (Das and Sarker, 2008: 82-91; 
Sarkar and Das, 2008:22). 
Despite such a successful achievement of JFM programme in West Bengal, some 
poor JFM households have higher incidence in the illegal extraction of Timber Forest 
Products (TFPs) to meet up their bare minimum level of subsistence in which law or force 
can not effectively control the illegal extraction of TFPs of these poor JFM households, 
which live below poverty line (Das and Sarker, 2008:91; Sarker and Das, 2008:35). It is a 
moral hazard problem for the government because such an illegal extraction of TFPs by 
the JFM household might be threatening the sustainability of forest resources. 
 
III. Data set and Methodology 
The data have been collected through an intensive field enquiry covering all 
members from FPCs under JFM villages (study group villages) and non-JFM villages 
(control group villages) – three sample female FPCs (core group), three joint FPCs (first 
control group) and two non-JFM villages (second control group). For the selection of 
female FPCs, random sampling technique (SRSWOR) is used. It is important to mention 
that each FPC under this study was formed in the respective village; so FPC/village is 
synonymous in this study. The field survey is conducted during the year 2005-06. In 
addition to the comparison on current data of after situation of JFM programme, data 
during before situation of JFM are also collected from all the households through the 
reflexive comparison method where ‘after’ and ‘before’ scenarios are compared for the 
participating households (Ravallion, 2001; Reddy et al., 2004; Reddy, and Soussan, 2004). 
But the period of data for ‘before situation’ was not same to all FPCs. ‘Before situation’ 
for each FPC is considered for the preceding one-year period from the starting of JFM 
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programme in the respective FPCs. However, a single ‘before situation’ is selected by the 
simple arithmetic mean of FPCs under study1. 
 
IV. Key Results  
At the very outset, we examine some basic characteristics of our sample JFM and 
non-JFM (Table 1). All members of four JFM villages out of six and all non-JFM villages 
are either SC or ST; around 48 per cent of households are landless, 41 per cent of 
households are marginal and the rest, about 11 per cent are small; over 77 per cent of 
households in each village live below poverty line2; except Baragari and Katul-2, majority 
of members in each village are illiterate. This study, however, indicates the abject 
economic and social conditions of the tribal people who are among the most 
disadvantaged group in rural Indian society. 
Table 2 presents per capita annual net real income (in INR)3 of various categories 
of households from forest source, non-forest source along with the change of income 
between two time periods (before and after situations of JFM). A common feature that 
emerges from Table 2 is that annual per capita net real income from forest source accounts 
for major share of per capita annual net real income for  all categories of households under 
both JFM and non-JFM villages during both the situations. It also shows that per capita 
annual net real income for all categories of households increases during after JFM 
situation under both JFM and non-JFM villages. But such an increase is higher for all 
categories of JFM households than that of among all categories of households in the non-
JFM villages after JFM situation. Categorically, the increase of forest income is higher for 
landless and marginal landholding households under JFM villages compared with same 
categories of households under non-JFM villages. The higher increase in income for 
landless and marginal categories of households under JFM villages has been made 
possible only due to substantial increase in income from forest source after JFM. It seems 
to be relevant to mention that during before JFM situation the share of per capita annual 
net real income from forest source out of per capita annual net real income from all 
sources for all households under our study (combining both JFM and non-JFM villages 
together) ranges between 63.56 and 70.58 percentage points indicating that forest was 
major source of income for all categories of households before JFM. After JFM, the share 
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of per capita annual net real income from forest source for the households under JFM 
villages, combining both female and joint FPC-villages together, works out between 67.96 
and 87.45 percentage points. For non-JFM villages, the share of per capita annual net real  
forest income from forest source out of per capita annual net real income for non-JFM 
households under our study ranges between 60.29 and 64.09 percentage points during 
before JFM situation, whereas after JFM situation  it lies between 55.26 and 64.59 
percentage points. Table 2 also shows that forest income for all households under JFM 
villages, irrespective of female and joint FPC-villages, has considerably increased after 
JFM programme; but the incidence of increase is much lower for the households 
belonging to the better economic position according to land-based economic status. 
Table 3 presents the break-up of household’s dependence on forest and non-forest 
sources of income during after and before situations of JFM programme (share in 
percentage of annual per capita net real income). An important feature that emerge from 
the table is that annual per capita net real income (combining all forest sources – NTFPs, 
forestry wage and timber forest products – together) accounts for major share of per capita 
annual net real income for almost all categories of households under both JFM and non-
JFM villages during both the situations. Table 3 also shows that timber income during 
after JFM situation for JFM villages is of two types: legal and illegal4. Legal timber 
earning for JFM villages is the share of government’s timber revenue received by 
households legally from the JFM forest. But during before JFM situation households’ 
income from timber for JFM villages was, basically, illegal. For non-JFM villages, timber 
income during both after and before situations is illegal. What is more important here is 
that after JFM situation annual net real income from timber forest products (TFPs) 
generating from illegal source for JFM households decreases to a large extent although the 
legal timber income constitutes a very small proportion of the annual per capita net real 
income for all households under JFM villages during the same period. Worthwhile to 
mention that within JFM villages the rate of decrease of illegal TFP income in the female 
JFM villages  is considerably high compared with joint JFM villages . Conversely, there is 
a significant increase in income from NTFPs and forestry wage labour for JFM households 
after JFM. Table 3 shows that before JFM the share of NTFPs’ income out of annual per 
capita net real forest income for JFM households in an average was below 25 percent, 
Working Paper No. 02 (2008) 
 
Authors Nimai Das and Debnarayan Sarker 
 
8 
whereas it was around 16 percent for non-JFM households during the same period. But 
after JFM situation the share of annual per capita net real forest income from NTFPs for 
JFM households marks a significant increase –around 158 percentage points for joint FPC 
households and around 193 percentage points for female FPC households- on an average, 
whereas such an increase is around 2 percentage points for non-JFM households on an 
average during the same period. However the incidence of increase of NTFPs’ income is 
more prominent for landless and marginal landholding JFM households after JFM. With 
regard to forest wage income is concerned, before JFM the share of forest wage income 
out of annual per capita net real forest income for JFM households in an average was 
below 8 percent, whereas it was around 7 percent for non-JFM households during the 
same period. But after JFM situation the share of annual per capita net real forest income 
from forest wage work for JFM households shows much higher increase – around 194 
percentage points for joint FPC households and around 149 percentage points for female 
FPC-households – in an average, whereas it is around 12 percentage points increase for 
non-JFM households in an average during the same period. The incidence of increase of 
forest wage income is more prominent for landless and marginal landholding JFM 
households after JFM. Table 3 also shows that income other than NTFPs and forest wage 
work decreases for JFM households in an average after JFM. These results, however, 
imply that the increase of NTFPs’ income and forest wage’ income are the only factors for 
the increase of annual per capita net real income for JFM households after JFM. 
As regard forest wage labour is concerned, not only the landless and marginal 
categories of households but also small landholding households in the JFM villages are 
involved in forestry works after JFM situation. This is due to attractive high forestry wage 
rate in forest sector compared with local rural wage rate in non-forest sector. The 
prevailing wage rate for forest wage labour after JFM situation is fixed at INR 67.50 
which is about a double of the prevailing average local wage rate for, usually, eight hours 
of service from 8am to 4pm (Sarker and Das, 2008:28). This rate is much higher than the 
forest wage rate of before JFM situation. However forest wage rate is fixed up by the 
government on the basis of market wage rate. More relevant, although the local rural wage 
rate was between INR 30 and INR 35 for, usually, eight hours of service from 8am to 4pm 
while we conducted our survey, it was also higher than the wage rate during before JFM 
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situation. The wage rate, however, changes time to time. While we undertook our study 
after JFM situation forest wage rate was fixed at INR 67.50 for, usually, eight hours of 
service from 8am to 4pm. The number of working days for forest fringe communities as 
wage labour under forest department is also more or less fixed while we conducted our 
study. After JFM situation, usually, one person from each JFM household with a family 
size of five or less gets the opportunity of forest work from thirty five to forty days per 
year. If the size of member of a household is grater than five, usually, two persons get the 
opportunity of forest work for seventy to eighty days in total per year from the same 
family (ibid). The number of days of employment for each forest wage labour per 
household per year is fixed at 35-40 days for the family size of five or less than five; two 
persons of a poor household with a family size of greater than five get the opportunity of 
forest wage work for 70-80 days per year (ibid).  
The break-up of annual net real income from legal and illegal forest sources for 
below poverty line households before and after JFM situations appears in Table 4. It 
reveals that the illegal income from TFPs after JFM has substantially increased (30.59 
percentage point) to poor categories of households which live below poverty line in 
Baragari joint FPC (column 9). The change of illegal income from TFPs after JFM for the 
same categories of households to other FPCs/villages is highly negative (ranging between 
20.77 and 74.47 percentage points). This is mainly because the change of income from 
legal forest products of the poor categories of households of Baragari FPC after JFM is 
much lower than that of same categories of households in other FPCs. In all FPCs, except 
Baragari, the change of income from legal sources of forest is highly positive ranging 
between 42.91 percentage point and 117.17 percentage point; in Baragari, this change is 
negative (12.92 percentage point). It clearly indicates that force or law can not effectively 
control the illegal collection of TFPs of the poor categories of households, which live 
below poverty line, until and unless a considerable income from legal forest source meets 
up their bare minimum level of subsistence. 
The study of Sarker and Das (2006a), based on FPCs under western Midnapore 
division in West Bengal, shows that for the maintenance of regular consumption needs of 
the local FPC-households, NTFP is the main source of money income because income 
from the share of government’s timber revenue and wages from forestry work constitute a 
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small part of their total income (p.279-280). Consequently, the NTFP is bound to provide 
the main and stable source of forestry income and it plays the major role for sustenance of 
JFM programme (ibid:286). This study also signifies that only government’s timber share 
(without any other share of the forest resource, namely NTFPs) seems to be insufficient to 
meet the immediate survival needs of poor JFM households. It causes large illicit felling 
(illegal timber extraction), mainly, by the poor forest communities due to the urgency of 
meeting immediate seasonal livelihood needs and food insecurity, which plagued the area 
and led to conditions of semi-starvation among the poor people (p.279). 
 
V. Theoretical Model  
This study, however, lends credence to the fact that despite the execution of JFMP 
government, the owner of forest resources, has to face a moral hazard problem with all   
categories of JFM households in general and for marginal and small categories of Baragari 
joint FPC village in particular who engage in the JFM programme as agents of 
government. It may be judged by the fact that government, the principal, can not legally 
control the major illegal felling of TFPs, which plays more adverse effect on the 
sustainability of forest resources, by these poor households. However, after JFM, although 
most of the JFM households decrease their illegal extraction of timber forest product they 
practiced before JFM situation, households below poverty line in one FPC (Baragari joint 
FPC) increase their illegal extraction of TFPs. Hence the issue is why do government fail 
to control effectively the illegal extraction of TFPs by the poor forest communities, who 
are almost depend on forest income as their major source of income and that live below 
poverty line  in JFM households in general and Baragari joint FPC in particular  after JFM 
situation? The answer seems to be very simple: the illegal extraction of TFPs may not be 
effectively controlled until and unless legal income from forest source (NTFPs and 
forestry wage work) for poor forest communities, who are almost dependent on forest as 
their major source of income and that  live below poverty line, meets up their bare 
minimum level of subsistence. A good incentive plan, which depends on the work (or 
output) related to forest activities, should make the payment of workers. But, to overcome 
this problem, government should not only expand forest wage work under development 
programme among these poor households but also grant a lump sum fee so that the bare 
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minimum level of subsistence of those poor households may be guaranteed. However, a 
lump sum fee independent of their production plus a good incentive fee dependent on their 
work (output) are required for livelihood sustenance of those people and sustainability of 
forest resources. As regards forest wage rate is concerned, it has been mentioned earlier 
that the prevailing wage rate for forest wage labour is fixed at INR 67.50 which is about a 
double of the average local wage rate for crop farm sector, for usually eight hours of 
service from 8am to 4pm. A simple theoretical model may be of help in examining these 
facts. 
An optimal contracting arrangement by the government – JFM household 
framework – can be defined as follows: A contract is optimal if it maximizes the expected 
utility of the government for an expected utility of the JFM household subject to the 
condition that the JFM household finds it worthwhile to participate in the contract. As is 
well known, government is the owner of forest land and under JFM programme 
government employs JFM household (agent) to work under the former for the 
management of forest resources. Let us suppose that there are only a finite number of 
output levels (q1, q2, q3, … qn). Let v and r be two efforts that can be chosen by the JFM 
household (agent) out of some set of feasible efforts. These efforts influence the 
probability of occurrence of different output levels. Let us suppose that the probability that 
the output level qi will occur if the agent chooses effort v(r) by πiv (πir). Let xi = x(qi) be 
the amount that the government pays the JFM household if output level qi is observed. We 
denote the lump sum fee k, the minimum subsistence level of JFM household, independent 
of qi. Then the expected profit of the principal (government), if agent (JFM household) 
chooses action v, is 
( ) ∑∑
==
−−
n
1i
iiv
n
1i
ii kπxq  ……………………. (1) 
The expected profit is assumed to be linear in qi. It implies that the principal is 
risk-neutral5. We assume that the agent is risk-averse6 and maximizes the expected utility 
from the payment. We also assume that the JFM household (agent) finds efforts costly, 
and write c(v) be the cost of effort v. The cost enters into JFM household’s utility function 
linearly. If JFM household chooses effort v, his/her expected utility less cost is given by 
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( ){ } ( )vckπxu
n
1i
n
1i
iivi −





+∑ ∑
= =
 , where u is the Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
function of the JFM household (agent). 
Two types of constraints are imposed on JFM household in this self-enforcing 
contract (non-enforceability in the courts does not make contracts valueless. The contract 
acts in such a way that each party chooses to adhere to its term) – participation constraint 
and incentive comparability constraint. 
Since the JFM household is a utility maximiser, he/she will choose action u if 
( ){ } ( )≥−





+∑ ∑
= =
vckπxu
n
1i
n
1i
iivi ( ){ } ( )rckπxu
n
1i
n
1i
iivi −





+∑ ∑
= =
  ……….. (2) 
and will choose effort  r otherwise. 
This constraint is referred to as the incentive compatibility constraint. The second 
type of constrain says that the JFM household may have other alternatives available that 
give him/her some utility u . Then the participation constrain is 
( ){ } ( ) uvckπxu
n
1i
n
1i
iivi ≥−





+∑ ∑
= =
  ……………………..…………………. (3) 
The expected utility the JFM household gets from this job must be at least as great 
as the utility he/she could get elsewhere. 
If the payment is based on effort rather than on output, then the government is to 
determine the expected profit from each effort by the JFM household and then induce the 
effort that minimizes government’s expected profit. But as the efforts of the JFM 
household are hidden, payment to him/her can not be a function of the unobservable effort 
(v, r). It can be made contingent on the observed output qi. Attempt has been made to 
develop results along this line. Suppose that there is no incentive problem.  However under 
the risk-neutrality assumption the government is indifferent to risk and thus there is no 
need to trade off incentives for risk-sharing. In such a case the principal’s (government’s) 
optimization problem is 
( ) ∑∑
==
−−
n
1i
iiv
n
1i
ii kπxq  
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subject to ( ){ } ( ) uvckπxu
n
1i
n
1i
iivi ≥−





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= =
 
where maximization is taken place over xi. 
In general, government will want the JFM household to choose xi to just satisfy the 
constraint so that 
( ){ } ( ) uvckπxu
n
1i
n
1i
iivi ≥−





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= =
 
The Lagrangian for this optimization problem is 
( ) ( ){ } ( ) 





−−





+−−= ∑ ∑∑
= ==
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1i
n
1i
iiviiv
n
1i
ii
 
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. 
Government is risk-neutral because her expected profit is linear in xi. 
Differentiating L partially with respect to xi and λ, and setting the derivatives to zero, we 
have the first order conditions as 
( ) 0πxuλπ iviiv =′−−  
( ){ } ( ) 0uvckπxu
n
1i
n
1i
iivi =−−





+∑ ∑
= =
 
The first of the above conditions states 
( )
λ
1xu i =′   , a constant. i.e., xi must be independent of i (xi is a constant). 
It may be judged by the fact that, as mentioned earlier, the wage rate for each 
individual of JFM household, who work under forest department, is fixed. Government’ 
wage rate is fixed at INR 67.50 for usually eight hours of work (8am to 4pm) per day, i.e., 
xi is independent of i. The wage rate does not depend on the return (high or low) of forest 
wage work of JFM household.  
This theoretical model seems to be important in that a good incentive fee 
dependent on their work (output) might not only provide livelihood sustenance of poor 
people living below poverty line and ensure sustainability of forest resources; rather a 
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good incentive fee dependent on their work (output) plus a lump sum fee independent of 
their production are required for livelihood sustenance of those people and sustainability 
of forest resources. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
One of the basic problems of this model is that government knows the JFM 
household’s utility function and incorporates this into contract with latter. However, 
acquiring this information may be harder than monitoring the JFM household’s effort. But 
some common features that emerge out from this study might help government take policy 
framework in this regard. Government knows that JFM households are almost dependent 
on forest source for their subsistence and income and more than three fourths of them live 
below poverty line. Government also knows that forest wage work JFM households 
perform under forest department is not equally distributed among JFM households. So 
what government should do in the short-run is to increase number of days for wage work 
per year for poor households in that area where more illegal extraction of TFPs is existent. 
Together with this, government should provide all JFM households the lump sum fee k, 
the minimum subsistence level of income, independent of qi. In the long-run, for higher 
income and employment government should expand the production of NTFPs in the JFM 
forest  following the instances of some JFM states such as Andhra Pradesh and Madhya 
Pradesh which are gradually reorienting R & D of NTFP species to meet community needs 
(World Bank, 2006:xxi ) and that have reasonable progress towards helping villagers 
improve sustainable non-timber forest production and harvesting, incorporating modest 
value addition, and building on local knowledge system( ibid:xxiii). Attempts should also 
be taken to establish small units of agro-based industry which may use local NTFPs as the 
main raw materials of that industry in the forest fringe area. To this work, the Ministry of 
Environment and Forests and state forest departments may wish to consider developing a 
new national strategic plan for R & D of NTFPs and policies to establish small units of 
forest based industrial units oriented through community forestry transitions and priorities. 
Added to it ,as the global market is widening for high-value non-timber forest products 
(ibid:15), forest communities of JFM programme also need to take advantage of these 
market prospects supported by appropriate policy and programme reforms. 
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Notes 
1. Although ‘after situation of JFM’ is simply the survey period (2005-06) of this research 
study ‘before situation of JFM’ is not the same for all FPCs/villages. ‘Before situation of 
JFM’ of this study implies one preceding year of the formation of each FPC under our 
survey. It is worth important to mention that before situation of JFM of each surveyed FPC 
differs from one another. Now a common before situation (single period) is measured by 
the Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Labourer [General]. Computation of common 
before situation (average of one previous year of respective FPCs formation) is made in the 
following line: 
 
Type of 
FPC 
Administrative 
division 
Name of 
FPC 
Before situation 
of JFM 
CPIAL of 
before situation Average CPIAL 
Bankura (N) Agua 1992-93 169 
Bankura (S) Malibona 1995-96 230 
Fe
m
al
e 
FP
C 
Panchayat (SC) Brindabanpur 1990-91 143 *18167.801
3
431302691
≈=
++
 
Bankura (N) Belboni 1992-93 169 
Bankura (S) Baragari 1995-96 230 
Jo
in
t F
PC
 
Panchayat (SC) Katul-2 1990-91 143 *18167.801
3
431302691
≈=
++
 
* The average CPIAL of common before situation of JFM is closely nearest to CPIAL of the 
year 1993-94 (188) 
 
2. Poverty line income in rural West Bengal on the basis of PCME (per capita monthly 
expenditure) by NSS of 56th round (1999-00) is INR 350.17. Based on the CPIAL 
(Consumer Price Index of Agricultural Labour [General]) the poverty line income for the 
year 2005-06 is calculated as INR 394.00 approximately. 
3. We directly use the study of Sarker and Das (2008) to determine the per capita annual net 
real income (in Rs.). For methodological details please see the said study. 
4. Never did the respondents say that their source of income was illegal; rather, while 
examining the answers from the respondents regarding the break-up of their source of 
income, the distinction between legal and illegal source was clearly demarcated. 
5. JFM household is risk-averse because they prefer a certain given forest income either from 
legal source or from illegal source to maintain minimum subsistence needs to a risky 
income with the same expected value. 
6. Government is indifferent between a certain given income and an uncertain income with 
the same expected value. It may be judged by the fact that SFR (2000) clearly mentions “as 
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a result of participatory and joint forest management activities in south West Bengal the 
vast tract of scattered, over-exploited and degraded forests containing mainly the sal were 
resuscitated and restored to productivity with great improvement in quality and density” (p. 
47). Thus due to execution of JFM programme the large scale illicit felling of TFPs, which 
destroys the sustainability of forest resource, have been largely stopped mainly due to free 
access of NTFPs by the poor forest communities in most of JFM forests. However, the 
impact of little illicit felling does not seem to make any significant change between a 
certain given income and an uncertain income with the same expected utility.  
 
 
 
[Details of methodology and dataset will add shortly in soft version] 
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